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CRYPTANALYSIS OF TWO SCHEMES OF BABA ET AL.
BY LINEAR ALGEBRA METHODS
VITALI˘I ROMAN’KOV
1
Abstract. We show that the attacks based on the linear decomposition
method introduced by the author and the span-method introduced by
Tsaban allow one to find the transmitted message in the cryptosystem
and the exchanged key in the protocol which are proposed in [1].
1. Introduction
In [1], S. Baba, S. Kotyada and R. Teja demonstrate how to define an
approximate one-way function FACTOR in a non-Abelian group. As exam-
ples of a platform for realization of FACTOR they suggest one of groups
like GLn(Fq), UTn(Fq), or Braid Groups Bn, n ∈ N. Here Fq denotes the
finite field of order q. They believe that the function FACTOR is one-way.
It means that the inverse to the FACTOR is easy to compute, while the
function itself is hard to compute.
Then, using FACTOR function as a primitive the authors of [1] therefore
define a public key cryptosystem which is comparable to the classical El-
Gamal system based on the discrete logarithm problem. Recall, that the
El-Gamal system can be described as follows: Let G be a public finite cyclic
group with generator g, and let x ∈ Z is Alices private key. The element
gx is public. To send a message m ∈ G, Bob picks a random integer y and
sends the cipher text c = (gy , gxym) to Alice. To decrypt, Alice calculates
(gy)x = gxy and inverts it to retrieve m.
In [1], the authors also propose a key exchange, analagous to the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol in a non-Abelian setting using FACTOR.
Recall, that the classical Diffie-Hellman protocol can be described as follows:
Let G be a public finite cyclic group with generator g, and let x ∈ Z is
Alices private key, as well as y ∈ Z is Bobs private key. Alice publishes
gx and Bob publishes gy. Then each of them computes the exchanged key
gxy = (gx)y = (gy)x.
In this paper, we apply and compare two methods of algebraic cryptanal-
ysis via linear algebra, namely, the linear decomposition method invented
and developed by the author in [2] - [4] and in [5] (with A. Myasnikov),
and the span-method invented and developed by B. Tsaban in [6] and in [7]
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(with A. Ben-Zvi and A. Kalka), to show vulnerability of the proposed in
[1] cryptosystem and protocol.
2. The ElGamal-type cryptosystem based on FACTOR [1]
Let G be any public group. Let g, h ∈ G be two private elements of
Alice, and let < g > and < h > be the cyclic subgroups generated by these
elements, respectively. In order to define the FACTOR problem one assume
that < g > ∩ < h >= {1}. Let f :< g > × < h >→ G be a function defined
as follows: f(gx, hy) = gx ·hy, where x, y ∈ Z. Obviously, that f is injective.
Then FACTOR(gxhy) = f−1(gxhy).
Cryptosystem. Let G be a non-Abelian group and let g, h ∈ G be
two non commuting elements. We assume that < g > ∩ < h >= {1}. We
suppose that Alice is the recipient of the messages and Bob is communicating
with Alice. Let m ∈ G be the message.
Alice picks arbitrary integers x, y ∈ Z and sets a public key (G, g, h, gxhy).
Alice has a private key (gx, hy) for decryption.
To send the message m, Bob picks arbitrary integers x′, y′ and sends
cipher text
c = (gx+x
′
hy+y
′
, gx
′
hy
′
m)
to Alice.
To decrypt the text, Alice uses her private key and calculates
(gx)−1(gx+x
′
hy+y
′
)(hy)−1 = gx
′
hy
′
.
Then she inverts it to retrieve m.
The authors of this scheme hoped that the security of the crypto system
described above reduces to solving FACTOR problem in the underlying
group. Below we’ll show that the system is vulnerable against linear algebra
attacks.
Cryptanalysis.
We will show that any intruder can efficiently compute gx
′
hy
′
and then
retrieve m.
I. First we will use the Tsaban’s span-method. We suppose that G is a
finite group presented as a matrix group over a finite field. So, let G ≤
Mn(Fq). Let V = LinFq(< g >) be the linear subspace of Mn(Fq) generated
by all matrices of the form gi, i ∈ Z. Then dim(V ) ≤ n−1. In fact, the matri-
ces 1, g, g2, ..., gn are linearly dependent, since g is the root of its character-
istic polynomial of degree n. Obviously, if gk+1 lies in LinFq(1, g, g
2, ..., gk),
then gk+t, g1−t ∈ LinFq(1, g
2, ..., gk) for every t = 2, 3, ....
We can efficiently construct a basis 1, g, g2, ..., gk of V by checking for
every succesive l = 1, 2, ... either gl+1 lies in LinFq(1, g, g
2 , ..., gl), or not.
Then k is the least l such that this happens. Such verification is carried out
by the Gauss elimination method which is known as efficient.
Consider the equation
(2.1) f(gxhy)h = hf(gxhy) ∼ fgxh = hfgx,
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that is linear with respect to n2 unknown entries of matrix f. We will seek
f in the form
f =
k∑
i=0
αig
i,
i.e., we seek a solution f in V. We know that there is a non-degenerate solu-
tion f = g−x. We can efficiently construct a basis e1, ..., ep of the subspace
of all solutions of (2.1) in V. Then we can use the following statement:
Invertibility Lemma [6] (see also [7]).
For a finite field Fq, e1, ..., ep ∈ Mn(Fq)), such that some linear combi-
nation of these matrices is invertible, if β1, ..., βp are chosen uniformly and
independently from Fq, then the probability that the linear combination
f =
∑p
i=1 βiei is invertible is at least 1−
n
q
.
Let element f be found. Then
f(gxhy) = h(fgx), f(gx+x
′
hy+y
′
) = (gx
′
hy
′
)hy(fgx))
and
(gx
′
hy
′
)hy(fgx))f−1(gxhy)−1 = gx
′
hy
′
.
So
(gx
′
hy
′
)−1(gx
′
hy
′
m) = m.
The message m is recovered.
II. Now we will use the author’s linear decomposition method. Let G ≤
Mn(F) be a matrix group over arbitrary (constructive) field F. Let V =
LinF(< g > (g
xhy) < h >) be the linear subspace of Mn(F) generated by all
matrices of the form gi(gxhy)hj , i, j ∈ Z. Then dim(V ) ≤ (n− 1)2.
Let e1, e2, ..., er be a basis of V that can be efficiently obtained in the
same way as described above. Let ei = g
ui(gxhy)hvi , ui, vi ∈ Z, i = 1, ..., r.
Since, gx+x
′
hy+y
′
∈ V, we can efficiently obtain a presentation of the form
(2.2) gx+x
′
hy+y
′
=
r∑
i=1
αiei, αi ∈ F, i = 1, ..., r.
The right side of (2.2) is equal to
(2.3) gx(
r∑
i=1
αig
uihvi)hy,
it follows by (2.2), that
(2.4) gx
′
hy
′
=
r∑
i=1
αig
uihvi .
The message m is recovered as above.
Remark. Remind, that the authors of [1] suggest as a platform for
their cryptosystem one of the groups GLn(Fq), UTn(Fq), or Braid Groups
Bn, n ∈ N. In our cryptanalysis, we consider only matrix groups. Any
group Bn admits a faithful matrix representation [9], [10]. The braid group
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Bn is linear via the so-called Lawrence-Krammer representation LK: Bn →
GLm(Z[t
±1, 1/2]), where m = n(n− 1)/2, is injective. The LawrenceKram-
mer representation of a braid can be computed in polynomial time. This
representation is also invertible in (similar) polynomial time (see [10], [11]).
3. The Diffie-Hellman-type key exchange protocol based on
FACTOR [1]
Suppose Alice and Bob want to exchange keys. Suppose G, g, h are as
in FACTOR. Let Alice pick a pair of integers (x1, y1), and Bob pick two
integers (x2, y2).
Then Alice sends the element gx1hy1 to Bob.
Independently Bob sends the element gx2hy2 to Alice.
Both Alice and Bob can recover the element K = gx1+x2hy1+y2 . This is
their private key.
Cryptanalysis.
Now we will apply and describe only the author’s linear decomposition
method. Let G ≤ Mn(F) be a matrix group over arbitrary (constructive)
field F. Let V = LinF(< g >< h >) be the linear subspace of Mn(F) gener-
ated by all matrices of the form gihj , i, j ∈ Z. Then dim(V ) ≤ (n− 1)2.
Let e1, e2, ..., er be a basis of V that can be efficiently obtained in the
same way as described above. Let ei = g
uihvi , ui, vi ∈ Z, i = 1, ..., r.
Since, gx1hy1 ∈ V, we can efficiently obtain a presentation of the form
(3.1) gx1hy1 =
r∑
i=1
αiei, αi ∈ F, i = 1, ..., r.
Then
(3.2)
r∑
i=1
αig
ui(gx2hy2)hvi = gx2(
r∑
i=1
αiei)h
y2 = K.
We succeeded again.
Of course, the Tsaban’s span-method can be applied too.
The described cryptanalysis has many analogues, presented in [2]-[7]. In
[8], a general scheme based on multiplications is presented. It corresponds
to a number of cryptographic systems known in the literature, which are
also vulnerable to attacks by the linear decomposition method. Note that
the Tsaban’s span-method allows him to show the vulnerability of the well-
known schemes of Anshel et al. [12], and the Triple Decomposition Key
Exchange Protocol of Peker [13].
A protection against linear algebra attacks is invented in [14]. It is de-
scribed in the case of the Anshel et al. cryptographic scheme but can be
applied to the Diffie-Hellman-type and some other schemes too.
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